Macron’s ‘en même temps’ on Putin leaves France’s reputation hanging in the mix

Roses twirl, chocolates swirl as the Paris skyline unfurls to a seductive French song in a Ukrainian defence ministry video clip released on Twitter last week to thank France for its weapons deliveries.

“Romantic gestures take many forms,” declares the video as singers Serge Gainsbourg and Jane Birkin breathlessly croon their 1960s hit tune, “Je t’aime…moi non plus” (I Love You…Me Neither). Footage of French Howitzers on the Ukrainian frontline then fill the screen as the video ends with a final plea: “Please send us more”.

Since the Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian government’s crack communications team has released videos thanking countries aiding their war effort. The clips invariably end with a culture-specific appeal for more weapons. The video for Sweden, for instance, was a tongue-in-cheek thanks for Stockholm’s Carl Gustav rocket launchers, set to the Abba single, “Money, Money, Money”.

Ukraine’s social media warriors could not have picked a more fitting audio track for France. Gainsbourg’s breathlessly sexy “Je t’aime…moi non plus” expresses need-laced thanks with an ambiguous declaration of love, but not quite, while urgently conveying desire – for guns, not roses.

The war in Ukraine has seen France on a rollercoaster ride between words and deeds, resolve and seeming appeasement, as Europe confronts one of its biggest security challenges since World War II.

Since the crisis began, President Emmanuel Macron’s swings between tough talk against Russian aggression, followed by warnings against humiliating President Vladimir Putin have irked France’s allies. Macron’s comments last week on France’s likely response to a tactical Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine was the latest example of confused messaging.

A week after US President Joe Biden warned of “Armageddon” should Russia use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Macron broke with the official iron-clad vagueness on the nuclear deterrence. In an interview with the France 2 TV station, Macron noted that, “France has a nuclear doctrine that is based on the vital interests of the country, and which are clearly defined. These would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region.”

Macron’s comments sparked a media storm with headlines noting that France would not “respond in kind” if Russia launched a nuclear attack on Ukraine.

A ‘clumsy’ but not strategic slipup

French officials however argue that much of the country’s “soft on Russia” characterisation is simply a matter of style over substance.

When it comes to Macron’s recent comments on a response to a tactical Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine, Samantha de Bendern, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme, is willing to give the French leader the benefit of the doubt.

Noting the difference between strategic nuclear weapons – which cause large-scale damage – and tactical weapons with smaller nuclear warheads and delivery systems for limited strikes, de Bendern believes Macron’s comments are not “as bad as everyone is making them out to be. France cannot give a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine for the simple reason that France only has strategic nuclear weapons,” she explained. “The only country that could carry a proportional nuclear response is the US, they are the only ones with tactical weapons. The tactical weapons in Europe are under US control.”

At 44, Macron lacks the Cold War experience of past European leaders who have publicly navigated the nuclear deterrence discourse. “I think it was clumsy. It would have been more politically wise to make no comment,” she noted. “But there’s no way France can have a tactical response to a tactical nuclear strike. That’s the reality.”

Not just the quantity, quality counts

Following Brexit, France is now the bloc’s only member with an autonomous nuclear capability and is the EU’s mightiest military, according to the 2022 Global Firepower ranking. But Paris has come under fire for its low level of military support to Ukraine.

The Ukraine support tracker by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy places France, with its €0.21 billion military commitments, much lower than the UK’s €3.74 billion and Poland’s €1.82 billion.

In early 2022, Germany faced severe criticism over its Angela Merkel-era cozying to Moscow, particularly its dependence on Russian gas, and its defence frugality under the US security umbrella. But since the Olaf Scholz administration launched its Zeitenwende (“dawn of a new era”) policy switch, Berlin has made an about-turn at breathtaking speed. Today, Berlin’s military commitments to Kyiv stand at €1.2 billion, according to the Ukraine support tracker.

French defence experts say that in the battlefield, it’s not just the quantity of military aid, but also the quality of weapons systems that can turn the tide on the battlefront. Paris has supplied Kyiv top-end Caesar howitzers, prized for their accuracy, that Ukrainian military officers in the eastern frontline have hailed as “very manoeuvrable and mobile”.

‘La Grande Muette’ steps up to the plate

But while US systems, such as the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) make headlines as “game-changers” in the Ukraine war, the French military lags behind its US and UK counterparts in putting out its message.

The French army – nicknamed La Grande Muette, or the Big Silent One – has a reputation for being secretive about its frontline actions. The Grande Muette moniker stems from deeply held principles of an apolitical army loyal to the Republic. But in the modern age of transparency and accessibility, the French military establishment can appear out-of-touch.

In a bid to address these criticisms, French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu over the weekend provided details of France’s military aid to Ukraine. In an interview with the daily, Le Parisien, Lecornu said France has supplied 18 Caesar artillery pieces and is in discussions to furnish six more.

Addressing Ukraine’s pleas for air defence systems following recent deadly Russian strikes on Kyiv and other cities, the minister said France was also sending Crotale air defence missile batteries. France has 12 Crotale batteries, Lecornu disclosed. While he did not specify how many will go to Ukraine, the defence minister maintained that “it will be significant to enable them [the Ukrainians] to defend their skies.”

The relatively small tonnage, compared with US supplies, reflects France’s low stocks after years of budget cuts, a situation confronting several European countries, explained de Bendern. “France is doing as much as it can because France does not have the capacity to send more weapons systems without endangering its own domestic and overseas security needs,” said de Bendern. “Europe needs to scale up its arms spending, which is difficult in a time of recession.”

‘En même temps’ on the diplomatic stage

The real problem appears to be not the medium, but the message. While Macron talks tough on Ukraine, his repeated warnings that Russia “should not be humiliated” infuriates France’s more hawkish NATO allies.

Back home, French voters are familiar with what they call their “en même temps” (at the same time) president. Macron’s self-confessed “verbal tic” sees him expounding a position, only to succumb to an “at the same time” rationale for a contradictory one. Critics say it displays the centrist president’s inability to adopt a position, opting instead for a verbal fudge of saying one thing, then its opposite and ultimately, nothing at all.

But on the international stage, and with Europe’s security at stake, en même temps does not play well. Following yet another warning about humiliating Putin, Polish President Andrzej Duda blasted his French counterpart in a June interview with German tabloid, Bild. “Did anyone say that Adolf Hitler must save face?…I have not heard such voices,” he fumed.

‘Diplomacy of balance’ loses its balance

Some foreign policy experts say Macron’s attempts to engage in a dialogue with Putin stems from France’s post-war “diplomacy of balance” – or the need to maintain independence to balance US power in Europe. “This is the Gaullist tradition of General Charles de Gaulle, very much of France going it alone. It’s a longstanding tradition in France. There is a sense that France understands Russia, a European power, and that France is the country with the most cultural affinity with Russia,” said de Bendern.

The war in Ukraine has unsettled France’s post-war vision of strategic autonomy as Western allies draw closer to defend a democratic, multilateral order that is being tested on the battlefront.

France’s pro-Russia politicians – such as the far-right’s Marine Le Pen and the far-left’s Jean-Luc Mélenchon – have jumped ideological hoops, ditching cherished positions, to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. But their nationalist streaks – including Mélénchon’s anti-US, anti-imperialist discourse – run deep in French public opinion and is not restricted to extreme left and right fringes.

“The Soviet and Russian secret services have long used France as a soft target for their activities. There were many ingredients for this in France, including a strong Communist Party. Now the far-right has plenty of influencers, Putin’s useful idiots who don’t realise they are being used by Russia to peddle information,” said de Bendern.

Keeping the message on track

As France, like the rest of Europe, heads for a tough winter, with high energy prices aggravated by the war in Ukraine, Macron needs to keep his words and deeds on track, analysts warn.   

“The French president’s enduring patience with Putin, along with dissenting positions on NATO, have damaged France’s credibility with eastern and northern Europeans,” noted Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador to the UN now with the Paris-based Institut Montaigne. “On the intellectual level, France’s leaders must acknowledge that, following its mad venture, Putin’s Russia will emerge weakened but also even more aggressive in its approach to Europe. It will retain considerable capacities to destabilise both, the countries it previously dominated in Central and, through economic and political pressures, Western Europe,” Duclos wrote.

“Clearly Macron has to do something about his messaging,” said de Bendern. “If the war ends in Ukrainian defeat – which it will if it loses Western support – sanctions won’t be lifted and the parts of the French economy that are suffering because of the war won’t suddenly recover. You don’t reward a nuclear bully. Macron has to explain that even if the war ends, it doesn’t mean sanctions against Russia will be lifted,” said de Bendern.

 It’s a tough message that will need to be said without “en même temps” hedging.