the gasoline struggle, a brand new weapon for the jihadists of the Sahel | EUROtoday
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Dn a word launched on Friday, November 7, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls on its nationals to quickly depart Mali “as soon as possible”. The safety scenario, warns Paris, “is deteriorating all the way to Bamako”. National roads are actually “the target of attacks by terrorist groups”. Commercial flights stay the one exit route nonetheless thought of protected. The spokesperson for the Quai d’Orsay, Pascal Confavreux, recalled on Thursday France’s “great concern” in regards to the scenario, specifying that the safety of the 4,300 French folks registered on the consulate remained “a priority”.
For two months, tanker vehicles have not crossed the principle roads within the South of this huge landlocked nation, 90% of whose commerce depends upon coastal ports. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the department of Al-Qaeda within the Sahel, imposed a blockade on gasoline deliveries to the capital. Convoys coming from Abidjan, Dakar or Conakry had been attacked and the depots burned. The end result: gasoline stations working dry, hospitals with out energy, faculties closed and an economic system on the verge of implosion.
This want to suffocate Bamako owes nothing to likelihood. At the start of September 2025, JNIM, by means of its spokesperson for the south and west of the nation, introduced an embargo on gasoline supposed for the capital. This determination is a part of a logic of reprisals in opposition to a measure of the Malian authorities: the ban on the sale of gasoline in cans, presupposed to deprive jihadist teams of their provide circuits. “It was this ban that ignited the situation,” explains an knowledgeable in authorized and safety points primarily based in Bamako. By wanting to chop off the terrorists’ gasoline, the federal government provoked their response: a nationwide blockade. »
The subject round gasoline
With its 5,000 to six,000 fighters, the JNIM doesn’t management any main metropolis, however its power lies in its mobility and its rural roots. In many localities, it imposes “peace agreements” below constraint: closure of faculties, non secular taxes, obligatory sporting of the veil. “Over nearly 1.8 million km², entire areas – particularly around Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal – escape state authority,” remembers our interlocutor. This lack of management isn’t new: it finds its roots in a long time of political errors, for the reason that rebellions of 1962, 1990, 2007 and particularly 2012. The present authorities inherit an extended sequence of poorly calibrated selections which have step by step weakened nationwide cohesion.
This territorial community, greater than navy conquest, provides the JNIM a formidable affect. Where the State is absent, it turns into a substitute authority, imposing its justice and its regulation. This mannequin, examined in Farabougou or within the middle of the nation, now extends to the outskirts of Bamako.
“The JNIM understood that gasoline is the key to everything: without it, neither the economy nor the war holds,” summarizes the knowledgeable. By reducing off roads and tanks, the jihadists are putting the guts of the system.
An uneven and hybrid struggle
Contrary to the alarmist situations evoking an imminent fall of the capital, “the terrorists have neither the means nor the strategy to seize Bamako, a metropolis of 3.5 million inhabitants today heavily militarized. Their objective is not to govern, but to paralyze,” warn many observers.
The JNIM acts in zones, by means of a succession of non permanent blockades: it cuts roads, harasses convoys, imposes its situations on remoted villages, then withdraws. A number of dozen fighters are sufficient to dam a whole area. “It’s a strategy of attrition,” explains the knowledgeable interviewed by Le Point Afrique. It avoids direct confrontation with Malian forces, however goals to exhaust the state, undermine the morale of the regime and undermine the boldness of the populations. »
The Malian Armed Forces or FAMa, already examined by greater than a decade of struggle, are struggling to safe a territory 3 times the scale of France. “They are under constant pressure,” acknowledges our interlocutor. They should each shield the roads and battle armed teams within the North and Center. Each convoy of tankers have to be escorted, which mobilizes monumental sources and weakens the system on the opposite fronts. »
But the jihadists’ technique partially backfired. Far from upsetting an rebellion in opposition to the junta, the blockade united the inhabitants. “Malians are exceptionally resilient,” underlines the knowledgeable. Despite shortages, concern and fatigue, life goes on. Residents assist one another, share the little gasoline obtainable, and arrange neighborhood solidarity. This peaceable, sudden resistance strengthened nationwide cohesion quite than breaking it. » The jihadists had been banking on social asphyxiation; they’re reaping a type of civil resistance.
Russia’s wager in opposition to the blockade?
In latest days, French diplomacy has not hidden its judgment: Paris sees within the present scenario the plain failure of the alliance with Moscow, contemplating that “the contested presence of Russia and the forces associated with it in no way ensures the security of Malians”. On the bottom, the findings appear to help this studying: the Russian instructors deployed in Mali – from the Wagner galaxy – targeted their efforts on defending the regime and mining websites, quite than securing the roads or countryside. Joint operations within the middle have value the lives of lots of of civilians and, removed from weakening the armed teams, have fueled the cycle of violence.
“It’s a reductive reading,” says our knowledgeable in Bamako. Certainly, the Russian alliance has not stored its guarantees: safety has not improved. But no international military — not even the French — was ready for this kind of struggle. The Malian battle is uneven and hybrid: it combines terrorism, cross-border crime and drug and arms trafficking. The teams transfer rapidly, cooperate with legal networks and exploit vulnerabilities within the territory. Even with good intelligence, the terrain stays impassable: destroyed roads, desert areas, excessive warmth. Few armies know battle in such an surroundings. »
Supporting his level, the knowledgeable deciphers for Le Point Afrique the character of this struggle which he describes as “hybrid”. “Initially, terrorism and crime were two distinct universes. In the 2000s, jihadists still condemned drug trafficking, seen as immoral. But, little by little, these worlds came together. Today, the same actors are found on several fronts: drug trafficking, smuggling, hostage ransoms and armed violence. »
According to him, this convergence is based on three levels: – logistical cooperation, where traffickers and fighters exchange fuel, weapons and information; – strategic coordination, where they negotiate territories and profits; – financial fusion, where the same networks manage both smuggling and terrorist operations.
Tramadol, a psychotropic drug widely consumed in the region, has become one of the main currencies. “These connections make Mali a crossroads for transnational crime,” he concludes. A basic military can do nothing in opposition to this. We are not dealing with jihadists, however a shifting, fluid, cross-border system. »
West Africa susceptible to collapse
“Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso today form an open-air laboratory for hybrid wars of the 21st century,” warns the knowledgeable. What is at stake goes past the Sahel: the roads managed by these teams already result in coastal nations. The contagion is on the rise. »
He is satisfied: quickly, sure international armies “will draw inspiration from the Malian terrain to understand how these faceless wars are fought.” And to warn: “If the area collapses, all the Sahelo-Saharan strip – from the Maghreb to West Africa – will turn out to be an uncontrollable no man’s land. »
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According to this knowledgeable, “if the blockade continues, the entire UEMOA zone will be affected: banks, transport companies, import-export contracts. Coastal countries are economically dependent on Bamako, whether via the port of Abidjan or that of Conakry. Leaving Mali alone in the face of this asphyxiation is to risk economic and security contagion. »
The alert also applies to ECOWAS, which he judges guilty of “putting politics before solidarity.” “Instead of tackling the structural causes of the disaster, it targeted on the legitimacy of navy regimes. Today, the precedence needs to be financial and humanitarian: securing convoys, supporting infrastructure, avoiding the collapse of commerce circuits. If nothing is completed, the entire of West Africa might collapse below the mixed weight of terrorism, financial chaos and nationalist withdrawal. »
https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/mali-la-guerre-du-carburant-nouvelle-arme-des-djihadistes-du-sahel-08-11-2025-2602718_3826.php