Following Viktor Orban’s election defeat on April 12, new Hungarian premier Peter Magyar has promised to hunt justice for crimes dedicated by his predecessor’s community of political allies and the oligarchs who supported them.
The corruption is properly entrenched: Orban dominated Hungarian politics for years with none severe challenger, and there has by no means been one other determine within the nation’s trendy historical past who amassed a lot energy in such a comparatively quick time period.
From the media to the judicial system and from universities to native governments, Orban’s empire infiltrated each state establishment. Nothing might be finished in Hungary with out political connections, one among Hungary’s wealthiest businessman informed the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza in April, whereas asking to stay nameless.
Magyar’s centre-right Tisza occasion gained 141 seats in parliament out of 199 within the April elections, giving it a big majority to strengthen the rule of legislation and doubtlessly unlock billions in funding from the European Union, which froze the allocation below Orban because of considerations over corruption and democratic backsliding.
Yet time is of the essence: Magyar has warned that oligarchs allied with Orban have begun siphoning off belongings to the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and “other distant countries”.
The Polish experience could provide some insight into what options exist for Hungary. After a liberal opposition bloc led by Donald Tusk came out ahead in October 2023 parliamentary elections, Tusk pledged as prime minister to reform Poland’s institutions following eight years of right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party rule. He immediately fired high-profile figures and bypassed some of the legal obstacles left by the previous government.
FRANCE 24 spoke with Balint Magyar – a sociologist, former education minister and author of the book, “The Hungarian Octopus: The Post-Communist Mafia State” – who argues that Hungary is embarking on not just a change of government, but a full-on regime change.
Magyar has promised to go after corrupt officials who were part of the so-called Orban system. Does he risk falling into the very illiberalism he pledged to abolish in seeking a rupture from the Orban years?
Peter Magyar won 53% of the votes in the elections on April 12, which gives him a more than two-thirds majority in the parliament. It meant that Orban’s attempts to make election law more disproportionate backfired. Such a constitutional majority is enough to change any law.
Among Magyar’s promises during the elections was instituting a proportional electoral system. The incoming premier has also promised to limit the maximum time for future prime ministers to two terms – eight years total.
What happened was not a government change but a regime change. A government change means that basic values are shared by the competing parties. In a regime, the competing parties do not share the same political values.
Hungarians witnessed the first regime change in 1990 from a communist dictatorship to a liberal democracy.
The second regime change happened in 2010, from a liberal democracy to an autocracy. This is what Orban called “a revolution at the ballot boxes”. In 2011, he rushed a new constitution through the parliament without any consultation with the public (called the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the new constitution codified a new interpretation of history and ethno-nationalist principles).
Magyar’s victory represents the third regime change in Hungary’s recent history, from an autocracy – hopefully – back to a liberal democracy. The incoming premier has pledged to hold a referendum on accepting a new constitution.
How difficult will it be to prosecute high-placed officials like Peter Szijjarto, the minister of foreign affairs and trade, who reportedly leaked information on EU summit discussions to Russia?
Looking to turn the page on Orban’s tenure, Magyar has pledged to pursue officials and corporate leaders accused of corruption: during his campaign, he launched a programme called “Road to Prison”. This was not an ordinary type of corruption. If you look at the international scene, you can see charges brought against Poland’s former deputy minister of justice in the Law and Justice government, Marcin Romanowski, or against Romanian politicians. These are minor cases compared to the scale of robbery of the state committed by the Orban clan’s politicians and oligarchs.
The Fidesz government operated like a mafia state. All contributing members of society were subordinated to it: it was a political enterprise which captured the state, the economy and the oligarchs. The mafia state had two motivations: monopolising political power and accumulating personal and family wealth. With the possibility of unilaterally appointing the heads of the controlling organisations and the presidents of the republic, central bank, constitutional court, chief attorney’s office and state account office, Orban could exercise direct coercion and blackmail over the whole society. As all these figures were subordinated to Orban, he could govern the state as a criminal organisation. Most of these actors and Orban-related oligarchs committed crimes, according to existing Hungarian legal code.
Magyar has called on all the leaders of the above-mentioned institutions to resign. If they don’t comply, he will use legal means to oust them from their positions.
Police have already begun investigations even though Magyar’s government isn’t in office yet. I don’t think rank-and-file loyalists will be prosecuted. What we will witness is the total collapse of the mafia-state organisation led by Orban.
Also, the difference between the Hungarian and Polish cases is that the Polish leader of the PiS party, Jaroslaw Kacznyski, was an autocrat but not a criminal, while Orban was an autocrat and a criminal at the same time.
There will be widespread legal procedures, although I have some doubt that stolen state assets will be recouped. (Wealthy Hungarians are leaving the country and transferring financial assets, according to the Financial Times.)
Orban has been voted out, but he once famously said in an interview with an Austrian tabloid that he “wish to tie the palms of the subsequent authorities. And not solely of the subsequent, however of the next 10 governments.” How massive of a menace does he and Fidesz current to the incoming authorities?
Orban’s defeat within the newest elections represents not solely a political, however a complete ethical collapse. There is a distinction between a mafia state and a “classic” mafia. The positions inside a traditional mafia are casual positions: they’ll bribe public servants if wanted, however they primarily function outdoors the governmental our bodies.
In the case of the mafia state, the positions are positioned throughout the state equipment. After profitable a constitutional majority, Magyar’s centre-right Tisza occasion can take again these political and administrative positions. Orban’s political-economic clan, subsequently, faces an unavoidable collapse.
A nationwide opinion ballot revealed this week requested Hungarians for the primary purpose for Orban’s defeat. Some 49% responded that it was corruption, round 18% responded that it was the dangerous financial scenario, and round 10% attributed the defeat to the lies of the federal government. This represents the twin nature of broad well-liked discontent: specifically, the whole amorality and incapacity of Orban’s regime.
This interview has been flippantly edited for size and readability.
https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20260430-dismantling-orban-legacy-reforms-that-lie-ahead-for-hungary-magyar